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Main ﬁ ndings
• Poland’s accession to the European Union and the opening of the British labour market 
to Poles have  contributed  to  the intensiﬁ cation  of contacts between  Britons  and the 
Poles and to a sharper image of Poland. Over half of those interviewed (53%) stated that 
they had  had  some contact with Poland  and/or  Polish  people. At  the  same time, 
however, only 6% of Britons had visited Poland in recent years.
• Poland is slowly ceasing to be a little known country on the periphery of Europe. More 
and more Britons have formed an opinion on the subject of Poland as a country and are 
ready to share it. In comparison with results of a survey from 2001, there has been a 
clear drop in the number of people who do not have an opinion on Poland.
• Britons are generally aware of the fact that Poland is part of Europe. Almost 70% of 
Britons know that Poland is a member of the European Union. By comparison, less than 
40% of Britons know that Slovakia is also a member of the European Union. Indeed, 
15% of Britons are not certain whether their own country belongs to the EU.
• There is a certain dissonance in the perception of Poland by Britons. Most respondents 
have no doubt that Poland is part of the community of democratic nations that respect 
the civil liberties of  their  citizens. This belief  is more  widespread now than in 2001. 
At the same time, they consider that quality of life is not optimal due to bureaucracy, 
corruption, lack of rapid economic growth and the signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence of the Catholic 
Church on social and political life.
• Poles have stopped being a little known and exotic nation for Britons. Intensiﬁ cation of 
contacts with Poland and Poles has helped Britons to form an opinion about them. Only 
8% of respondents could not answer a question on whether Poles tended to be similar to 
or different from Britons. By comparison, nine years earlier, twice as many respondents 
could not answer this question. Furthermore, in the case of questions concerning social 
distance, the percentage of “difﬁ cult to say” replies did not exceed 5%. One third of Brit-
ons are of the opinion that Poles are similar to them, whilst a quarter consider that Poles 
are a little similar and a little different.
• Over half of those interviewed (52%) stated that Poles ﬁ t into British society well or very 
well. Almost all Britons unanimously accept tourist travel to the UK by Poles and have 
nothing against Poles as neighbours or friends. What is more, Britons accept Poles as 
family members. Somewhat more respondents would be against their company being 
managed by a Pole – although even in this case, less than a third of the population is op-
posed. Similarly, one third of interviewees do not want Poles to settle for good in Brit-
ain. 40% of Britons do not accept the granting of British citizenship to Poles. It is most 
difﬁ cult for the British to accept a Pole as a local councillor. Britons perceive the short 
term presence of Poles in the UK (economic migration) much more positively than their 
settling down for good and participating in social and political life.
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• Direct contact between inhabitants of the UK and Poles and the greater attention paid 
by the media has led to a distinctly warmer and generally improved image of Poles, in 
comparison with that presented in the survey carried out nine years ago. Britons who 
have had contact with Poland and Poles are signiﬁ cantly more ready to accept them not 
only as friends and family members, but also as fellow citizens or councillors.
• British respondents’ evaluation of the effects of migration of Poles to the United King-
dom is not unqualiﬁ edly positive. Britons see the positive impact of the presence of 
Polish immigrants on the economic growth of the United Kingdom and also the in-
crease in inﬂ ows to the state budget from taxes – so say almost 50% of interviewees. In 
the opinion of Britons, however, Polish immigration has a negative side. The inﬂ ux of 
cheap and conscientious Poles has led to many Britons (60%) seeing it as the cause of 
the growth in unemployment. Poles are also accused of wage dumping and hence caus-
ing a general lowering of wages.
• The typical Polish migrant is an unqualiﬁ ed worker – over 75% of respondents ex-
pressed such an opinion. What’s more, not only do they undertake the most difﬁ cult 
jobs, but they also do them conscientiously and well: their work is highly regarded by 
employers. On the other hand, however, this conscientious and cheap worker is taking 
work from Britons – so say almost 60%  of  respondents. At the same time, according to
nearly 70% of respondents, British employers are satisﬁ ed with Poles’ work.
• On balance, the presence of Poles in the United Kingdom is viewed positively: over half 
of Britons consider that opening of the labour market to Poles was the right decision, 
with one third of Britons strongly agreeing with this statement.
• The Polska! Year programme helped to promote Polish culture to social elites and to 
demonstrate that Poland is not just good vodka and efﬁ cient workers. However, the 
broader British public were not generally aware of the programme – only 8% of Brit-
ish society had heard about the year of promoting Polish culture in Great Britain, and 
a mere 1% of respondents stated that they had actually taken part in cultural events or-
ganised under this programme.
• The image of the Poland brand is still rather blurry. Although Polish products can now 
be found everywhere, there are still no leading brands with which Poland is associated 
abroad.
• This study shows that Poles are good ambassadors for their country, shaping the image 
of Poland and Poles in a signiﬁ cant way. Poles are well-liked by the British in personal 
relations and accepted as members of British society. The inﬂ uence of Polish immigrants 
on the perception of Poland and Poles in the United Kingdom should be appropriately 
reﬂ ected in Polish public and cultural diplomacy.
6 Joanna Fomina, Justyna Frelak
Introduction
Poland’s accession to the EU has not only had direct economic, political and social con-
sequences, but also a momentous symbolic dimension, as it has formally conﬁ rmed Po-
land’s membership of ‘the West’ – of a group of highly-developed, democratic states. 
However, actual changes do not always go hand in hand with changes in people’s per-
ceptions. With Poland having been a member of the European Union for several years, 
we wanted to take a closer look at the image/national brand of Poland. We wanted to see 
whether, in the eyes of the British public, Poland still remains ‘a poor relation’ and an un-
derdeveloped Eastern European country or rather a dynamic new partner state and an EU 
member of equal standing. The study below was carried out six years after the British la-
bour market was opened to Poles – which resulted in (large-scale) emigration of Poles to 
the United Kingdom. We paid particular attention to how this phenomenon is perceived 
and to changes in the image of Poles. We were also interested in how Poland is perceived 
as an EU member and in the international arena.
This  report  was prepared on  the  basis of a  survey conducted in  Great Britain  by 
QRS Market Research Ltd on a representative group of 1,029 respondents, as part of “The 
Perception of Poles and Poland in the Great Britain” project, co-ﬁ nanced by the Polish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs under an ongoing programme intended to promote knowledge 
about Poland.
This publication originated as part of one of the many projects analysing the percep-
tions of Poland and Poles abroad, conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs. Prior to Po-
land’s EU accession, the Institute had carried out a survey on how Poland and selected EU 
countries (including Austria, UK, Sweden and France) perceive each other. The ﬁ ndings 
from this project, carried out in 1998–2001, were presented in the publication Obraz Polski 
i Polaków w Europie1. Following Poland’s accession to the European Union, we conduct-
ed another survey on the perception of Poland in Germany2. The Institute also published 
reports on how Poland and Polish foreign policy were portrayed in the press of ﬁ ve EU 
countries3. In 2007 and 2008, we analysed the press coverage of Poland’s and Germany’s 
European policies4. The analysis of the coverage of the economic migration of Poles in the 
British press was presented in NEXT STOPSKI LONDON. Public Perceptions of Labour Mi-
gration within the EU. The Case of Polish Labour Migrants in the British Press, published in 
20085. As a follow-up to our research in this area, we ran an analysis of the German press, 
which resulted in a publication entitled Polska migracja zarobkowa do Niemiec – fakty i mity. 
1 L. Kolarska-Bobińska (ed.), Obraz Polski i Polaków w Europie, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2003.
2 M. Fałkowski, A. Popko. Polacy i Niemcy. Wzajemny wizerunek po rozszerzeniu Unii Europejskiej, Instytut 
Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa 2006; L. Kolarska-Bobińska, A. Łada (ed.), Polska–Niemcy. Wzajemny wizerunek 
i wizja Europy, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2009.
3 M. Warchala (ed.), Wizerunek Polski w prasie krajów Unii Europejskiej, Institute of Public Affairs, War-
szawa 2002; M. Fałkowski, (red.), Pierwsze kroki w Unii. Polityka Polski w prasie europejskiej, Institute of Public 
Affairs, Warsaw 2004., 
4 B. Ociepka, A. Łada, J. Ćwiek-Karpowicz, Polityka europejska Warszawy i Berlina w prasie niemieckiej i pol-
skiej, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2008.
5 J. Fomina, J. Frelak, NEXT STOPSKI LONDON. Wizerunek polskich imigrantów w prasie brytyjskiej, Insti-
tute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2008.
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Polnische Arbeitsmigration nach Deutschland – Fakten und Mythen.6 What is more, simultane-
ously with the survey on the perception of Poland and Poles in Britain, we ran a similar 
project in Ukraine.
This report contains two chapters and conclusions. The ﬁ rst chapter introduces the con-
text for discussing the research ﬁ ndings. Factors shaping the image of Poland as a country 
and as a member of the European Union, and also the Polish émigré milieu are described. 
The successive waves of Polish migration to Great Britain and how this immigration has 
been perceived up till now by the British public are also brieﬂ y discussed. Statistics relat-
ing to the post-accession migration (after 1 May 2004) are also presented, as is a proﬁ le of 
post-accession Polish workers and the economic results of this phenomenon. The Poland 
brand is dealt with separately. 
Chapter Two presents the results of quantitative surveys: we have looked at how the 
mass presence of Poles in the UK has affected perception of Poland and Poles. A factor that 
should not be overlooked is that our perception of foreigners (and their country of origin) 
is inﬂ uenced by the role in which we encounter them. Since 2004, Poles have not only been 
able to live legally in Britain, but have also enjoyed the full rights of EU citizens – they can 
take up any work, participate in local politics, and also claim social (welfare) beneﬁ ts. In 
the analysis of the study, the perception of the effects of Polish migration and the percep-
tion of the Poland brand have also been discussed. 
Setting the context
The aim of the present chapter is to provide the social and political context  for our sur-
vey. We discuss the internal situation in Poland, relations with neighbours and  signiﬁ cant 
events on the international political scene that may have shaped the perception of  Poland. 
Moreover, we attempt to shed  some  light  on  the history  and  situation  of Poles in the 
UK as well as discussing public perception of immigration in general and the debate on the 
opening of the British labour market to Poles. Finally, we discuss the factors that shape the 
Poland brand, with particular emphasis on the year of Polish culture in the UK under 
the Polska! Year banner.
The image of Poland vis-à-vis the Polish political context 
The perception of the internal situation of Poland and its standing in the internation-
al arena is one of the main areas of our research. Over the last two decades, Poland has 
undergone a root-and-branch transformation, but the question remains as to whether the 
perceptions of Poland in other countries have followed suit. As the 2001 perception survey 
showed, these changes had not found their way into the awareness of the European ‘man 
in the street’ and the image of Poland was still based on the old clichéd way of thinking: 
‘East vs. West’, ‘civilization vs. savagery”, with Poland sitting ﬁ rmly on the wrong side of 
6 J. Frelak, A. Łada, K. Schwartz, R. Parkes (cooperation/Zusammenarbeit): Polska migracja zarobkowa do 
Niemiec-fakty i mity. Polnische Arbeitsmigration nach Deutschland – Fakten und Mythen, Institute of Public Af-
fairs, Warsaw 2009.
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the limes7. Mateusz Fałkowski postulated that Poland would not be able to alter the way it 
was perceived by Europeans until it crossed this boundary ofﬁ cially, by its accession to the 
European Union.
Joining the EU club was tantamount to formal acknowledgement by other mem-
ber states that Poland had fulﬁ lled the Copenhagen criteria and therefore was a country 
founded on the rule of law, protection of minorities and a market economy. However, 
upon Poland’s EU accession, the external political pressure to meet democratic standards 
was eased, as was Poland’s internally-driven aspiration to put its best face forward in the 
international arena. As a consequence, Eurosceptic, populist parties – earlier kept at bay 
with a sort of ‘cordon sanitaire’8 for fear that their participation in power could hold up the 
accession process – rose to power in Poland and several other Central European countries. 
Even the mainstream parties themselves on more than one occasion were unable to refrain 
from populist slogans or political movements. After all, the motto ‘Nice or Death’, urging 
a Polish veto of the EU Constitutional treaty, came from the lips of the aspiring prime min-
ister in a centre-right Liberal-Conservative cabinet.
The ﬁ rst years after EU accession were accompanied by slogans calling for ‘repairing 
the Polish state’, which ﬁ rst and foremost meant ﬁ ghting corruption, hyped as the cru-
cial problem eating away at the country’s social and political life. In practice, this meant 
not only the setting up of a new institution speciﬁ cally aimed at ﬁ ghting corruption (the 
Central Anticorruption Bureau), which developed a reputation for involving big names 
from the world of politics, medicine and business in spectacular trials and for extending 
the lustration law, which effectively amounted to a restriction of civil liberties. The process 
of building a ‘Fourth Republic’ was accompanied by appeals for ‘moral renewal’, targeted 
at representatives of the intellectual, business and political elites, and in particular, sexual 
minorities. In 2007, the British public had a chance to see Poles determined to change this 
state of affairs, queuing for hours to get to polling stations in Polish consulates.
Ever since Poland joined the EU, it has been notorious for being an ‘awkward partner’: 
quarrelsome, overly focused on its own needs and obstructing various European initiatives. 
However, the new government installed in 2007 changed the way Poland’s foreign and Euro-
pean policy was pursued. The several years of ‘Dying for Nice’, ultra-scepticism vis-à-vis the 
European Union and the confrontational approach to relations with Poland’s neighbours came 
to an end. In the last few years, Poland has indeed made great efforts to change the way the 
country is perceived and promote itself as a reliable and responsible partner, one that values 
stability and intra-Community cooperation and sees the need for continued integration.
The greatest change has been the political discourse relating to Polish interests in the EU 
and worldwide, and the strategies whereby these interests could be furthered. The present 
Government has stressed the need to pursue the interests of the Polish raison d’etat – how-
ever, not in conﬂ ict with EU interests, but rather within the framework of broader EU de-
velopment9. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has emphasized that Poland should look for 
7 M. Fałkowski, Polska jako Wschód and jako Zachód, [in:] L. Kolarska – Bobińska, Obraz Polski i Polaków 
w Europie, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2003.
8 J. Kucharczyk, J. Zbieranek, Democracy in Poland 1989-2009. Challenges for the future, Institute of Public 
Affairs, Warsaw 2010.
9 Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s policy speech, http://wyborcza.pl/1,90699,5239927,Expos%E9_premiera_
Donalda_Tuska.html; http://or ka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter6.nsf/0/6372FE4B9619C127C125739D0053E245/
$ﬁ le/2_a_ksia z ka.pdf.
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effectiveness and not just ‘assertiveness’, as has been the case so far10. This rhetoric has 
been accompanied by speciﬁ c actions to reinforce credibility, efﬁ cacy and Poland’s solidar-
ity with other countries in Europe and on the global scene.
Unlike its European neighbours, Poland went through the global economic downturn 
practically unscathed. In 2009, Poland was the only country in Europe to record economic 
growth. This has provided a premise for dispensing with the traditional East-West divi-
sion and we can now speak about the reasonable and responsible North and the less ﬁ scal-
ly level-headed South. Even though the economic crisis in Europe reinforced protectionist 
tendencies in EU countries, Poland was keen on promoting the solidarity of all European 
states. On the initiative of Premier Tusk, an informal meeting of Central European coun-
tries with the President of the European Commission among the attendees was organized 
to demonstrate that the new member states fully embraced the principles of the single 
market and supported the Commission’s activities.
Furthermore, Poland has also proved that it can be an active player in European poli-
tics, if the interests of the Polish state so demand. The adoption of the Eastern Partnership 
by the European Union should be counted among Poland’s major achievements in the Eu-
ropean arena. This was the ﬁ rst time that an initiative proposed by a Central European 
country and a relatively new EU member was endorsed as a Community policy. Poland’s 
criticism of the EU’s excessively restrained response to the Russian intervention in Georgia 
and persuading the EU to take a more determined stance can be quoted as another exam-
ple here. An extraordinary meeting of the European Council which helped develop more 
appropriate joint actions was held on the initiative of Prime Minister Tusk in September 
2008. Poland was also able to skilfully make use of its EU membership in resolving prob-
lems with its eastern neighbour. For instance, the European Commission accepted the idea 
of European energy solidarity as one of the basic principles when negotiating a new agree-
ment between Russia and the EU.
The election of Jerzy Buzek as President of the European Parliament was an event which 
has had momentous consequences for Poland’s position in the European arena. The former 
Polish Premier received support from three quarters of European Parliament members. 
His term of ofﬁ ce coincided with the Lisbon Treaty coming into force, which considerably 
strengthened the European Parliament’s role and reinforced its standing vis-à-vis other 
European institutions. The institutional changes as well as Buzek’s personal qualities and 
activities have made the former Polish Premier the most prominent EP President in its en-
tire history.
The presence of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Russian Prime Minis-
ter Vladimir Putin at the ceremony commemorating the 60th anniversary of the outbreak 
of World War II, held at the Westerplatte memorial in Gdańsk, symbolized reconciliation 
with neighbours with whom Poland has never had easy relations. Prime Minister Putin 
publicly declared the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, which resulted in the partition of Po-
land, to be immoral. A year later, Prime Minister Putin’s attendance at a ceremony com-
memorating the 1940 Katyn massacre, where thousands of Polish ofﬁ cers were killed by 
the NKVD, was widely received as a signiﬁ cant diplomatic gesture. In his address, Putin 
spoke of Stalin’s direct responsibility for these killings. (Commemoration of and the ques-
10 A. K. Cianciara, The European Policy of Donald Tusk’s Government, Analyses and Opinions No. 8/93, In-
stitute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2009.
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tion of responsibility for the Katyn massacre have constituted one of the most problematic 
areas in Polish-Russian relations).
The Smolensk plane crash – a catastrophe without precedent in contemporary history, 
which claimed the lives not only of the Polish President and his wife, but also of many oth-
er eminent Polish ﬁ gures – attracted the attention even of those who had had little interest 
in international affairs. The history of difﬁ cult and painful relations between the two na-
tions seemed to be resurfacing again. However, owing to the sympathetic response of the 
Russians, including many spontaneous signs of compassion and support from ordinary 
Russian citizens, the developments following the catastrophe could well be described as a 
genuine act of Polish-Russian reconciliation.
In recent years, Poland has on many occasions been portrayed as an ally of Britain, with 
Euroscepticism being the common denominator linking the two countries. The United King-
dom has praised Poland for a more free-market approach to the economy than that typically 
practised in the ‘old’ member states. Poland was also one of the last countries to ratify the 
Lisbon Treaty, which caused so much controversy in the UK. Contrary to the policy pur-
sued by his government, President Kaczyński delayed the signing of the document until the 
eleventh hour. As regards the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Poland only subscribed to the 
so-called British Protocol, a pruned version of the instrument. It is also worth mentioning the 
cooperation between the conservative wings of the Polish and British political spectrum, par-
ticularly within the European Parliament. In 2009, a new EP political group was formed, the 
ECR, which comprises Poland’s Law and Justice, Britain’s Conservative Party and several 
other conservative groupings, with Michał Kamiński as its chairman.
It should be noted, however, that the Eurosceptic stances of the two countries were fre-
quently founded on dissimilar premises and interests. The UK’s criticism of the European 
Union is predominantly focused on the alleged collusion of federalists, apparently keen to 
create a European super-state. In this sense, British Euroscepticism has a strong anti-Brus-
sels edge. As regards our own homegrown Eurosceptics, Poland’s main fear is the domi-
nation of smaller countries by bigger ones – notably Germany. In Britain, one of the major 
concerns is related to the model of a‘social Europe’–if it was imposed, it would allegedly 
slow down the British economy, cripple the resilience of the labour market and the com-
petitiveness of enterprises. In Poland, on the other hand, a ‘social Europe’ does not arouse 
so many worries. These ideological discrepancies are particularly visible in the context of 
the political marriage between the economically liberal British Conservatives and pro-so-
cial Law and Justice Party, consummated in the EU European Conservatives and Reform-
ers political group. The radically divergent views on the Common Agricultural Policy held 
by the Polish and British political allies are a case in point here.
Likewise, it is difﬁ cult to ﬁ nd a common denominator between the UK and Poland 
in the context of the opposition of both countries to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Whilst Britain has mainly harboured doubts of an economic nature (such as the concern 
that extensive employee rights might prove harmful to enterprises), Poland has predom-
inantly had the socio-cultural dimension in mind. Poland’s primary concern has been a 
‘backdoor’ introduction of a set of social rights, irreconcilable with Catholic values and of-
ten put by Polish conservatives on a par with the so-called ‘Western civilization of death’ 
– i.e. the right to abortion, the right to enter into marriage and adopt children by homo-
sexual couples (rights which are guaranteed in the United Kingdom and do not give rise 
to any major controversy).
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The perception of Poles and Poland and the Polish émigré community in the UK
Polish émigrés are frequently viewed as ‘ambassadors of Polishness’ abroad. Garapich 
writes about the myth of the Polish Diaspora’s mission, whereby the Polish community 
abroad assumes the role of an ‘informal arm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’11. In our 
study, we speciﬁ cally focused on the role of Poles living in Britain in the shaping of per-
ceptions about their native country. It is worth recalling that although prior to 2004 Poles 
had never come to the UK on such a massive scale, migration of Poles into Britain has a 
long history. Poles emigrated to Britain in the nineteenth century, just as they did in the 
wake of World War I. Contemporary Polish migration is traditionally divided into three 
waves: post-War emigration, post-Solidarity migration and post-accession migration. The 
ﬁ rst two are usually described as political, whereas the current, third wave is predomi-
nantly seen as economic. Garapich emphasizes that there is a clear hierarchy of motives 
underpinning emigration, and therefore of people driven by these motives: ‘We, people 
raised in Christian and Platonic values, ﬁ nd it obvious that things ideological should at 
all times prevail over things material, that spirit is superior to impure matter’12. In other 
words, political emigration is viewed as more respectable than economic migration, one 
in search of ‘a better life’. It should be noted that while the ﬁ rst and the third waves can be 
clearly deﬁ ned, the second wave in practice encompasses the migration of Poles spanning 
the period from the 1960s until 2004, which means that referring to it as a post-Solidarity 
wave is not exactly precise. What is more, the economic and political divisions are not as 
clear-cut for all the three migration waves in question.
The ﬁ rst group comprises not only former Polish Army soldiers whom the end of World 
War II found outside their homeland, but also POWs (prisoners of war) and DPs (dis-
placed persons)13 from camps liberated by the Allies. Post-War emigration is seen as po-
litical, since the key motive for staying in Britain was a fundamental objection to the new 
regime installed in Poland and fear of repressions. Nevertheless, DPs recruited under the 
European Voluntary Worker Scheme were treated by the British government of the day as 
foreign manpower, as economic migrants with whom work contracts were initially signed 
for only twelve-month periods14.
The post-War Polish Diaspora frequently viewed themselves as victims of both Stalin 
and Hitler, ever bearing a grudge against Britain for its role in the Yalta Conference and 
the resultant subjugation of Poland by the USSR15. However, return to a communist Po-
land would have meant imprisonment or even capital punishment for a large part of the 
11 M. P. Garapich, Migracje, społeczeństwo obywatelskie i władza. Uwarunkowania stowarzyszeniowości etnicz-
nej i rozwoju społeczeństwa obywatelskiego wśród polskich emigrantów w Wielkiej Brytanii, [in:] M. Duszczyk, M. 
Lesińska (eds.), Współczesne migracje: dylematy Europy i Polski, Centre for Migration Research at the University 
of Warsaw, Warsaw 2009, pp. 39-69, p. 50.
12 Ibidem.
13 DP (displaced persons), so-called dipisi in Polish, refers to people whom the end of the War found out-
side their country.
14 K. Sword, Identity in Flux. The Polish Community in Great Britain. School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies, University of London, London: 1996; J. Zubrzycki, Polish Immigrant in Britain. A Study of Adjustment. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 1956.
15 J. Fomina, C. Husband, Inhabiting Heteroglossic Media Spaces: Intra-group transitions, identity construction 
and the language-media interface of ‘Bradfordian Poles’, (in) T. Moring (ed.) Living languages in bilingual media en-
vironments, NORDICOM, Helsinki 2011 (in preparation).
12 Joanna Fomina, Justyna Frelak
post-War emigration. On top of that, communist Poland was considered as an alien coun-
try, not to mention the fact that Poles who were born in the eastern regions of pre-War Po-
land had nowhere to go to as the lands where they were born and bred were now a part of 
the Soviet Union16.
According to Ostrowski, the decisions as to whether to return to Poland or settle in Brit-
ain were very painful. These people often felt betrayed by the United Kingdom, which, 
in their opinion, ignored their contribution to victory in World War II: they received no 
invitation to the victory parade, and Polish Army soldiers were treated as civilians17. At 
this point, it is worth mentioning the “Silver Brigade” – Polish ofﬁ cers and political activ-
ists whose military ranks and positions were not recognised after the war by the British 
authorities, who were often forced to take up unskilled jobs such as polishing silver in ho-
tels.18 In addition, the ‘myth of return’ to their native land helped many of these people to 
nurture Polish culture and language in their families, and encouraged them to build an 
infrastructure for the Polish community19. At the same time, the United Kingdom was a 
country where, despite various difﬁ culties, they were able not only to settle down and set-
tle in, but also in many cases, to achieve a relatively high economic and social status20. Ed-
ucation of children was a matter of paramount concern, and many émigré children became 
lawyers, teachers or physicians. The perception of Polish émigrés as brave allies as well 
as political refugees also helped establish their high status in British society. The inﬂ ux of 
immigrants from the former British colonies also certainly played a part, as they took the 
spotlight off Poles, assuming the role of the ‘alien’ in British society21.
As regards the second wave of emigration, neither dubbing it ‘post-Solidarity’ emigra-
tion nor ascribing political motives is entirely accurate. In fact, Poles emigrated to the UK 
throughout the post-War period, and although some of these people did indeed leave and 
stay in Britain for political reasons, others did so in search of a better life for social and 
economic ones. Many of those who emigrated in the 1960s (during the so-called thaw) and 
later until 2004, had relatives or friends in the United Kingdom. The Polish Diaspora struc-
tures and the ‘migration industry’ played an important role here as they contributed to 
the emergence of quite populous Polish émigré communities even before Poland’s EU ac-
cession. As Garapich noted, the ‘migration industry’, an infrastructure that allowed Polish 
emigrants to stay in Britain, often verged on the illegal, sometimes even involving break-
ing the law, which led to Polish workers being abused by their employers22. This was a pe-
riod when Poles were associated with doing jobs that were inferior to their qualiﬁ cations, 
often in a semi-legal context – even if in reality many emigrants were able to move out of 
16 Ibidem; A. Położyński, Z drogi i przydroża, “Vipart”, Warsaw 1997.
17 M. Ostrowski, To Return To Poland Or Not To Return – The Dilemma Facing The Polish Armed Forces At The 
End Of The Second World War, unpublished work, http://www.angelﬁ re.com/ok2/polisharmy/.
18 This term was mainly used in relation to Polish staff at Claridge’s in London, but also in relation to 
Poles in other cities such as Bradford.
19 J. Fomina, interview with representatives of the second generation of post-War Polish Diaspora and 
with Polish post-accession migrants in Bradford, held as part of the project: Bilingualism, Identity and Media 
(BIM), ﬁ nanced by the Academy of Finland.
20 J. Fomina, C. Husband, Heteroglossic Media Spaces…op.cit; A. Położyński, Z drogi i przydroża…op.cit.
21 R. Miles, A. Phizacklea, White Man’s Country, London Pluto Press, London 1984; Solomos, 2005; J. Fo-
mina, BIM project interviews.
22 M. Garapich, The Migration Industry and Civil Society: Polish Immigrants in the United Kingdom Before and 
After EU Enlargement, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34 (5), 2008, pp. 735-752.
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the ‘grey economy’, validate their Polish diplomas and certiﬁ cates, acquire new qualiﬁ ca-
tions and rise to a relatively high social status.23 
As mentioned above, post-accession migration has predominantly been economic in na-
ture. This is corroborated by the results of a Eurobarometer survey on geographical mobil-
ity within the EU. According to this survey, socio-economic issues (such as pay levels and 
access to health care) have been the key factors driving migration from the new member 
states24. However, it should be underlined that it is no longer unemployment that prompts 
Poles to leave their homeland, but better career prospects and new personal opportuni-
ties. Poles leave Poland because they want to leave and not because they feel compelled to 
do so, seeing no prospects for themselves at home. This has been conﬁ rmed, for example, 
by surveys conducted by the Centre for Migration Research at the University of Warsaw, 
which reveal that 47% of respondents who decided to leave had employment in Poland, as 
compared to 22% who were unemployed25.
Let us now look brieﬂ y at post-accession migration strategies. In addition to short-term 
migration, which is strictly economic in nature and involves accumulating some savings 
and then returning home, other strategies, sometimes termed ‘innovative’, are pursued. 
As well as so-called storks (typical seasonal migrants) and masters (migration as a one-time 
opportunity to accumulate capital)26, migrants also encompass people for whom opportu-
nities to receive education abroad, learn a foreign language or have an adventure are as 
important as economic advancement. Described as foragers or salmons in the literature of 
the subject, they direct their efforts towards increasing their social capital, and accept work 
below their qualiﬁ cations as a necessary and temporary phase in their career.
Post-accession migrants show more individualistic attitudes than do those who emigrat-
ed earlier; they also have a higher degree of social mobility. People who have left Poland 
ﬁ rst try to satisfy their own needs, and not those of their families at home, which is cer-
tainly linked to their young age as well as single marital status. In the UK and Ireland, 90% 
of the respondents spend their wages on everyday needs, 42% spend money on entertain-
ment and journeys, while 30% of the respondents put some money aside27. The amounts 
and the beneﬁ ciaries of remittances to Poland can serve as yet more evidence of highly 
individualized migration. Only half of respondents send money they have earned abroad 
to their families regularly, while the other half do so just once in a blue moon. On the one 
hand, Poles are earning wages enabling a way of life that is beyond their reach in Poland, 
but on the other, they are taking on typical immigrant jobs, known as ‘3D jobs’ (Dull, 
Dirty, Dangerous), and the increased remuneration can be seen as a form of compensation 
for this unpleasant work. It should be stressed that although Poles will often initially take 
jobs that are ‘unwanted by the indigenous population’ as they are easily accessible and 
require little command of English, this is not where the careers of most Polish immigrants 
23 J. Fomina, BIM project interviews.
24 Geographic Mobility in the context of EU enlargement, [in:] Employment in Europe 2008 report, European 
Commission, Brussels 2008. p. 122.
25 P. Kaczmarczyk, Współczesne migracje zagraniczne Polaków. Aspekty lokalne i regionalne, Centre for Migra-
tion Research at the University of Warsaw, Warsaw 2008, p. 230.
26 J. Eade, S. Drinkwater, M. P. Garapich, Polscy migranci w Londynie – klasa społeczna and etniczność, Centre 
for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism, University of Surrey 2006.
27 M.P. Garapich, D. Osipovič, MIGPOL, Badanie sondażowe wśród obywateli polskich zamieszkałych w Wiel-
kiej Brytanii i Irlandii, September 2007, p. 7.
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end. Once they have gained a better understanding of the British labour market and have 
improved their knowledge of English, a considerable number of Poles ﬁ nd work in jobs 
for which they are qualiﬁ ed or, after completing the necessary training, will take up other 
higher-status employment28. Nevertheless, despite the considerable social mobility of new 
Polish migrants, earlier surveys conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs indicate that 
in Britain the word ‘Pole’ has come to mean a cheap and reliable worker. The media have 
emphasized that Polish workers are industrious, affordable and well-qualiﬁ ed29. Our sur-
vey sets out to investigate the opinions of Britons about the jobs that Poles take and the 
opinions held by British employers about Polish employees.
Interestingly, the hierarchized division into ideological and material motivations is also 
clearly visible in the way representatives of the post-War Polish community and twenty-
ﬁ rst century migrants view each other30. Various surveys show that the older migrants 
sometimes ﬁ nd it difﬁ cult to understand how one can leave Poland of one’s own free will. 
They frequently criticize the overly materialistic and demanding attitudes of new mi-
grants31.
Poland’s EU accession and the opening of the British labour market to Poles have 
played a crucial role in how Poland and Poles are perceived. Despite alarmist reports in 
the Polish media about the smear campaign directed at Poles living in the United King-
dom, a more thorough analysis of (British) press coverage has revealed that the perception 
of Poles in the British media is surprisingly positive. Even tabloids, with all their penchant 
for sensationalism and for causing anxiety among their readers, have often written about 
Poles in friendly or at least neutral terms. If Poles were portrayed in an unfavourable light, 
this was most frequently in the context of some criticism of the government driven by anti-
immigration moral panic, and they were not criticized per se – this particularly concerned 
the Conservative Daily Mail, which at the time of Poland’s accession was in opposition to 
the government.
The shaping of perceptions of another nation often involves a dichotomous division, – it 
is based on splitting people into ‘us’ and ‘them’. It must be borne in mind, however, that, 
unlike Poland, the United Kingdom is a country of huge cultural diversity, which has be-
come home to many ethnic groups. We can say therefore that perceptions of Poles have 
been formed not only by making comparisons between Poles and the white British, but 
also between Poles and other national, ethnic and cultural groups. Since the present study 
primarily focuses on the perception of Poland and Poles following EU accession, we did 
not ask respondents about their knowledge of or opinion on Poland’s contribution to vic-
tory in World War II or to world cultural heritage. Instead, we asked how Poles were per-
ceived in comparison to other ethnic groups living in Britain.
Signiﬁ cantly, representatives of the British elites have sent some signals to the Polish 
community indicating that Poles are the ‘preferred’ ethnic minority. For instance, the Con-
servative MP Greg Hands appealed to Polish migrants not to return to Poland, claiming 
that Poles were ‘Britain’s favourite migrants’32. Poles are good at making the best of a situ-
28 J. Fomina, BIM project interviews.
29 J. Frelak, J. Fomina, Next Stopski London. Wizerunek polskich imigrantów w prasie brytyjskiej, Institute of 
Public Affairs, Warsaw 2007.
30 J. Fomina, BIM project interviews.
31 Ibidem.
32 M. P. Garapich, Migracje, społeczeństwo obywatelskie …op.cit.
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ation and use the fears related to the challenges of multiculturalism – including fear of 
home-bred terrorism – to their own advantage and emphasize their cultural ‘afﬁ nity’ as 
compared to other ethnic groups. This was the context in which, in the wake of the 7/7 
terrorist attacks, the London ofﬁ ce of the Polish Tourism Agency exhibited a poster show-
ing a Polish pilot with the caption reading: ‘Londoners, we are with you again33’. On top of 
that, Polish émigrés themselves usually harbour a strongly-rooted notion that, by compari-
son with others, they are more liked and respected on account of their willingness to blend 
into British society, their industriousness, readiness to learn English, afﬁ liations with Euro-
pean culture and –not least – the colour of their skin 34.
Perception of immigration in British society
The British are generally regarded as an extremely liberal society, open to people with 
different cultures and viewpoints. British multiculturalism is constantly presented as a 
model to follow as far as dealing with cultural diversity and integration of immigrants is 
concerned. At the same time, however, the British public has long viewed immigration as 
a key challenge and a social problem that neither the government nor local authorities can 
cope with.35 This is particularly striking when set against other European countries.
The Transatlantic Trends survey36 indicates that immigration is one of the most serious 
problems for one ﬁ fth of UK citizens (as compared to 35% a year earlier), with the EU aver-
age being 11%. And it has to be borne in mind that the EU average has been considerably 
pushed up by Italy alone (18%), as only 5-7% of respondents in the remaining EU countries 
see immigration as a problem that should be addressed urgently. Interestingly enough, the 
upward trend began towards the end of the 1990s. In the mid-1990s, a mere 5% of the pub-
lic regarded immigration as a major challenge facing British society.37
Furthermore, the highest negative immigration perception levels in the EU could be ob-
served in the UK, with 66% of interviewees feeling that immigration was more of a prob-
lem than an opportunity. Also, British citizens’ estimate of the number of immigrants in 
their country was nearly three times higher than the actual number. Similarly, half of the 
respondents expressed the belief that immigrants bring down wages of British employees, 
and more than half agreed that immigrants take away jobs from native-born workers. In 
particular, the British were worried about low-skilled migration, with 58% of respondents 
in support of restricting immigration of people with low qualiﬁ cations and skills. Being 
aware of the ‘migration myths’ which have gained considerable currency in British society, 
we decided to examine in more detail whether, and to what degree, these myths apply to 
Polish immigrants.
What is particularly important in the context of our report is that 47% of British citi-
zens believe that there are ‘too many’ immigrants from other European Union countries, 
and this certainly applies to the new member states, including Poland. The alarmist British 
33 Ibidem.
34 J. Fomina, Światy równoległe – wizerunek własny Polaków w Wielkiej Brytanii, Institute of Public Affairs, 
Warsaw 2009. J. Fomina, C. Husband, Heteroglossic Media Spaces…op.cit. Cf. M. P. Garapich, Migracje, społe-
czeństwo obywatelskie…op.cit.
35 J. Frelak J., Fomina J., Next Stopski London…op.cit, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw.
36 Transatlantic Trends: Immigration, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2009.
37 A. Thorp, (ed.), Impacts of Immigration, House of Commons Research Papers 08/65, 25 June 2008.
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press reports about the growing number of newcomers from Eastern Europe, Poles in par-
ticular, have certainly played a role in this38. For this reason, our survey included a ques-
tion on how the 2004 decision on the opening up of the labour market to Polish persons 
was received by the British public.
Various surveys show that opinions about immigration vary from region to region and 
depend more on the perceived rather than the actual impact of immigration. Other factors 
which correlate with attitudes to immigration include social status, contacts with ethnic 
groups, political discourse and media coverage.39
It should also be observed that support for giving legal immigrants the same social (wel-
fare) beneﬁ ts as native-born citizens is much lower than the EU average (50% to 72%). No 
such discrepancies are visible, however, when it comes to supporting immigrants’ political 
rights, as the percentage of British citizens who would give immigrants the same right to 
political participation is nearly on a par with the European average. Signiﬁ cantly, assess-
ment of the British government’s management of immigration was the most negative of all 
countries polled40. In their paper, Carey and Geddes go as far as to show that belief about 
the Government being unable to handle migration has largely been responsible for the re-
cent government change in the UK41.
Consequences of post-accession migration to the UK: objective analyses, media, 
public opinion
As already mentioned above, migration is frequently analyzed in terms of its social and 
economic consequences. More often than not, however, such analyses contrast somewhat 
with opinions held by the native population about immigrants themselves. This is certain-
ly the case in Britain, where, as earlier studies carried out by the Institute for Public Affairs 
have shown, Polish immigrants are viewed much more favourably than Polish immigra-
tion as a whole. However, detailed knowledge about this is rather limited, and opinions 
can change depending on the political or economic climate, e.g. during an election cam-
paign or a period of economic downturn. Invariably, the most heated debates concern such 
issues as the inﬂ uence of immigration on the labour market and unemployment ﬁ gures, 
and these aspects should be probed in more detail.
Many independent expert studies have conﬁ rmed that the liberalization of the labour 
market begun in 2004 had a small but positive impact on the economies of the host coun-
tries. One such study estimated that the ﬂ ow of people within the EU-8 in the period 2004–
2007 increased the aggregate GDP of the enlarged EU by approximately 0.17% in the short 
term and by 0.28 % in the longer term42.
The opening of the labour market has not led to the forcing out of the native population 
from the labour market. Instead, workers from the ‘new’ member states have helped to ﬁ ll 
38 J. Frelak J., Fomina J., Next Stopski London…op.cit.
39 A. Thorp, Arabella (eds.) Impacts of Immigration,…op.cit.
40 Translatlatic Trends…op.cit.
41 S. Carey, A. Geddes, Less Is More: Immigration and European Integration at the 2010 General Election, Par-
liamentary Affairs 63 (4), Oxford University Press 2010, pp. 849-865.
42 The impact of free movement of workers in the context of EU enlargement. Report on the ﬁ rst phase (1 January 
2007 – 31 December 2008) of the transitional arrangements set out in the 2005 accession treaty as requested according 
to the transitional arrangement set out in the 2003 accession treaty, European Commission, Brussels 2008.
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the skills gap in host countries, including the UK. Despite prevalent views about immi-
grants bringing down wages, the advent of Poles has not led to the lowering of pay levels 
in Britain. On the contrary – workers from the ‘new’ member states tend to choose other 
sectors of the economy and do not compete with the native workforce. On the other hand, 
however, when people take up jobs at the lowest rate on a mass scale, this can occasionally 
be reﬂ ected in the overall pay levels on the local labour markets43.
On the whole, immigrants from the ‘new’ member states of the EU did not rush to col-
lect welfare beneﬁ ts across the EU. Do Poles contribute more to the British social welfare 
system than they take from it? A report published by the British Centre for Research and 
Analysis of Migration (CreAM) makes it very clear that Poles and immigrants from other 
‘new’ member states pay more into the state budget than they receive from it. This is due, 
amongst other things, to higher employment rates and the fact that they seldom apply for 
welfare beneﬁ ts. By comparison, 90% of immigrant men and 74% of women work, whereas 
the corresponding ﬁ gures for the working-age British population are 78% for men and 71% 
for women44, respectively. Moreover, according to CreAM, the probability that migrants 
from the A8 countries (who have worked at least a year in Britain) will collect welfare ben-
eﬁ ts or live in council housing is 60% smaller than in the case of native British citizens.
On the other hand, however, in some cases immigration does indeed strain British pub-
lic services and housing services at the local level. This problem has on many occasions 
been picked up by the British media. The press have provided extensive coverage of the 
resultant burden on the public services sector and criticized the authorities for their unpre-
paredness to deal with this matter45.
With the onset of the recession and rising unemployment, however, Poles, just like other 
immigrants, provided an easy target for the media, primarily the tabloids46. For instance, 
The Daily Mail reported that: Jobs dry up but Poles stay to reap the beneﬁ ts47 and that: Foreign 
workers surge by 114,000 ... but the number of Britons with jobs falls48. The year 2009 saw sev-
eral industrial actions in the UK to protest against employing immigrants, including Poles 
(e.g. at power stations), organized under the slogan: British jobs for British workers.49 Poles 
also came under attack from the extreme right-wing organization Combat 18 in Northern 
Ireland, which summoned Poles and other immigrant minorities to immediately leave its 
territory, declaring that Northern Ireland was for white Britons only50.
In a period of economic downturn, Poles, like other immigrants, may be perceived as 
an even greater threat to the labour market – this is due, amongst other things, to the fact 
that native-born workers are forced to take up jobs which had earlier been done by immi-
grants, e.g. in agriculture51. These negative attitudes may also be fostered by employers’ 
43 Cf.: S. Lemos, J.N. Portes, New Labour? The Impact of Migration from Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries on the UK Labour Market, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn 2008, p. 32.
44 C Dustmann, T Frattini, C. Halls, Assessing the Fiscal Costs and Beneﬁ ts of A8 Migration to the UK, Centre 
for Research and Analysis of Migration, London 2009, p. 8.
45 Frelak J., Fomina J., Next Stopski London…op.cit Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw, p. 49.
46 A. Koziński, ‘Bezcenni imigranci’, Polska The Times, 31 July 2009.
47 Daily Mail, 9 January 2009.
48 Daily Mail, 12 August 2010.
49 R. Booth, ‘Mediators called in as wildcat strikes spread across UK’, The Guardian, 31 January 2009.
50 D. McKittrick, Belfast immigrants warned: ‘Get out by tomorrow – or you die’, “Independent” 10 July 
2009.
51 S. Bates, ‘British workers compete for seasonal jobs as recession bites’, The Guardian, 14 April 2009.
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preferences, as they would rather give work to immigrants, owing to their modest pay ex-
pectations, greater ﬂ exibility and determination to retain their job52.
A pertinent issue in this context is so-called ‘brain waste’, i.e., working below one’s 
qualiﬁ cations. Poles tend to choose typically immigrant niches, as that is where the de-
mand for labour is in the host countries. According to surveys, this is true for 40% to 80% 
of Polish emigrants. Such a situation in the longer term may ultimately lead to devaluation 
or a total loss of qualiﬁ cations and deteriorate the labour market situation both abroad and 
at home. On the other hand, Poles take up such jobs for a limited period only; as their lan-
guage competences and experience increase, they are very likely to look for jobs more in 
line with their aspirations.
The Poland brand
A country’s image is largely deﬁ ned by the way its activities and its products are per-
ceived in other countries. Its image evokes responses which have a bearing on the public 
at large and on consumer decisions and attitudes. ‘Buyers appraise products on the basis 
of their “country of origin”’.53 How a given country is perceived comes to be strongly as-
sociated with a brand and frequently underpins buyers’ decisions. The importance of this 
issue should not be underestimated, as is shown by the rewards reaped by brand owners 
who capitalize on the renown enjoyed by given products from their country e.g. Japanese 
cars, Italian clothes or French wines54.
What is the popular perception of the Poland brand? Information on how Poland is 
viewed in comparison to other countries is provided by the Anholt-GfK Nation Brands 
Index. The ranking, which covers 50 countries, calculates the reputation of each individual 
country based on six composite measures: people; exports; governance; tourism; culture 
and heritage; and investment and immigration. In the 2008 ranking, Poland was placed 
30th, between China (29th) and the Czech Republic (31st)55.
Poland was ranked the highest in the ‘governance’ dimension, which measures public 
opinion on the competency and fairness of the government, observance of civil rights and 
foreign policy. In the ranking of ‘exports’ which shows how a country’s brands are per-
ceived, we were placed 25th. Poland is ranked at the bottom of the list in two areas, ‘tourism’ 
and ‘culture and heritage’. We can therefore say that Poland is not generally perceived as an 
attractive tourist destination or a country with interesting historical monuments or cultural 
assets, while Polish products are ranked somewhere in the middle of the scale.
 Surveys by the Polish Tourism Agency (POT) indicate that ‘the perception of Poland is 
not negative but rather bland or blurred’. On top of that, Poland does not have a cohesive 
and distinct image.56 This is certainly largely due to how the country’s image is managed: it is 
52 R. Ford, ‘Britons vie with immigrants for low-paid jobs’, The Times, 16 March 2009.
53 P. Kotler, Marketing, Gebethner i Ska, Warsaw 1994.
54 Analiza wyników badań wizerunku Polski i postrzegania polskiej marki na świecie. Założenia i rekomendacje do 
pozycjonowania Polski jako kraju docelowego podróży turystycznych na lata 2009-2015, Polish Brand Institute, War-
saw 2008, p. 72.
55 W. Smoczyński, ‘Polska: kraj bez twarzy’, Polityka, 30 June 2009.
56 Analiza wyników badań wizerunku Polski i postrzegania polskiej marki na świecie. Założenia i rekomendacje do 
pozycjonowania Polski jako kraju docelowego podróży turystycznych na lata 2009-2015, Polish Brand Institute, War-
saw 2008, p.72.
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divided into a host of constituent components, which, however, do not make up an integral whole. 
Aspects which do not need advertising or even consolidate old stereotypes are often promoted (e.g. 
folk crafts).
As Polish migrants arrived in the UK, they were followed by many food products, 
which are now available across Britain. Due to their numbers, Poles soon became a signiﬁ -
cant group of consumers, which is corroborated by statistics showing food exports from 
Poland to the UK. At the end of 2003, Poland’s food exports to the UK totalled PLN 619 
million.57 By comparison, in 2009 Polish exporters brought food products into Britain with 
a total value of PLN 2.9 billion (approx. GBP 630 million). Poland is one of the four coun-
tries alongside China, India and Ireland which in fact boosted their UK exports in the crisis 
year 200958. Polish-British trade exchange is largely driven by Polish entrepreneurs, who 
set up their businesses in Britain, specializing in catering, warehousing and retail.
One can ﬁ nd a Polish store in nearly every little town, while bigger supermarkets (Sains-
bury’s, Morrisons, Asda or Tesco) have opened special sections offering Polish food prod-
ucts. The Tesco chain currently has 200 Polish products on offer, and this range is constantly 
expanding. Producers of sweets, cold meats, juices and beverages are currently the most ac-
tive on the British market. Similarly, Polish beers such as Tyskie, Lech and Żywiec are also 
available both in British supermarkets and pubs. The products are mostly purchased by 
Poles. Moreover, Poles spend 67 pounds on food per week on average, 30% of these funds 
being spent on Polish products. When doing so, they distinctly prefer shops specialising in 
the sale of such foods.59 The strength of this market is shown beyond any doubt by the spec-
tacular proﬁ ts of Polish breweries which export their products to Britain. Unlike other Polish 
products, Polish beer is enjoying an increasing popularity among British consumers too, as 
they have developed a liking for beer from other countries, until recently considered exotic. 
We decided to check knowledge of Polish brands among the British public in more detail 
and ﬁ nd out whether they are willing to buy products ‘made in Poland’.
While the British can obviously associate vodka and beer with Poland, do they have 
any knowledge of Polish culture? Polska! Year, an initiative by the Polish Ministry of Cul-
ture and National Heritage and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was started in the spring 
of 2009 and continued until the end of 2010. Polska! Year encompassed a series of cultural 
events organized across Britain. Its aim was to promote Poland by offering opportunities 
to the British public to learn more about Polish achievements in culture and to strengthen 
contacts between culture professionals in the two countries.
According to the organizers, diversity and cooperation were to be the hallmarks of the 
initiative. While Chopin is a name familiar to many (though not necessarily in association 
with Poland), Mickiewicz or Kieślowski probably only rings a bell to the more educated 
members of the British public. Contemporary Polish culture, popular music, theatre and 
art, however, are practically unknown outside Poland. The organizers set out to improve 
this situation and thereby to help shape the perception of Poland and Poles and show Po-
land as a modern country which not only keeps up with new trends in culture and art, but 
also co-creates them. This was also intended as an attempt to reverse the stereotypes and 
negative perceptions of Poland and Poles. As part of the project, there have been hundreds 
57 ‘Polskie marki w Wielkiej Brytanii – skazane na polskie półki?’ Cooltura/ Polarity UK, 15 October 2010.
58 Mimo kryzysu rośnie polski eksport do Wielkiej Brytanii, PAP, 5 March 2010.
59 ‘Polskie jedzenie częścią brytyjskiej kultury’, Cooltura/ Polarity UK, 7 June 2010.
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of exhibitions, screenings of feature ﬁ lms, cartoons and documentaries, concerts of classi-
cal, jazz and contemporary music, meetings with famous Polish artists, theatre perform-
ances, conferences and seminars.
Polska! Year received very good coverage in the media. The press – mainly quality news-
papers such as The Guardian, The Financial Times and The Daily Telegraph and publications 
focusing on culture and art – dwelt extensively on individual cultural events. Press reports 
were very enthusiastic, without a touch of condescension. We must bear in mind, how-
ever, that Polska! Year has mainly been orientated towards elites and ambitious individuals 
who are not only interested in culture, but are also sufﬁ ciently open to be willing to ex-
periment with the cultural products of New Europe, and choose the Polish option from the 
extensive cultural range available. In our study, we assess what proportion of the British 
public has actually taken part in the Polska! Year events and their reaction to them. How-
ever, we cannot hope to be able to assess any deeper impact of the programme – to do so 
we would have to carry out qualitative research.
Results of quantitative analysis
The perception of a given country and its citizens is based on a combination of many 
factors. It is generally acknowledged that direct contacts with citizens of a given nation 
are not needed to fuel national stereotypes. In fact, thanks to direct personal contacts, such 
stereotyped notions can not only be modiﬁ ed, but also cease to be as ideological and emo-
tionally charged60. Meetings with foreign nationals provide us with an opportunity to de-
mythologize the image of a given nation and transform it on the basis of our own impres-
sions and experiences. It can be expected that six years after Poland’s accession to the EU, 
the perception of our country and its inhabitants will have changed radically – that Poland 
in the eyes of Britons is now a modern and developed country, situated ﬁ rmly ‘within the 
pale’, and that Poles are less exotic and distant. Due the mass migration of Poles to the UK, 
the intensity of contacts between Poles and Britons has certainly changed. In this chap-
ter, we will look at the inﬂ uence of Poland’s accession to the EU on the perception of our 
compatriots by the British: whether Poles are seen as very similar and close – as “us Euro-
peans” or still as others, aliens – “them”. We will see how Britons perceive the results of 
the opening of the British labour market and how they view the typical Pole. We are also 
interested in the image of Poland as a country. Furthermore, we will take a closer look at 
the degree to which changes in Polish political and social life have ﬁ ltered through to Brit-
ish public opinion and have been ‘incorporated’ into the general image of our country. In 
our survey we asked Britons their opinions on the subject of various aspects of the internal 
situation of Poland (e.g. the Catholic Church, corruption and economic growth) and se-
lected issues linked with Poland’s position in the international arena. Finally, we will look 
at Polish product recognition (including cultural products) and what effect this has on the 
Poland brand in the United Kingdom.
60 J. Konieczna, Polacy-Ukraińcy, Polska-Ukraina. Paradoksy stosunków sąsiedzkich, Stefan Batory Foundation, 
Warsaw 2003.
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Contacts with and public perceptions of Poland and Poles
Poland’s accession to the EU and the opening of the British labour market to Poles has 
increased the intensity of contacts between citizens of these two countries, and in conse-
quence made the image of Poland more clear-cut. Owing to such contacts, and increased 
interest on the part of the media, Poland is becoming an increasingly recognizable, close 
and familiar country. Moreover, over half of the interviewees declare that they have al-
ready had some forms of contact with Poland and Poles (Fig. 1).
Figure 1. Have you had any contact with Poland and Poles?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
Signiﬁ cantly, nearly 60% of respondents who have had such contacts know some Poles 
who live in the UK. The workplace is a frequent site for contacts between Poles and the 
British; it has been so for half of the interviewees who have had contact with Poland and 
Poles. Interestingly enough, no clear differences in terms of age (a slightly larger number 
of young people), social group or type of occupation can be observed. This may be due 
to the fact that Polish workers can be found in practically the whole of the labour market. 
By contrast, mass media, books, cultural books and products are a much less signiﬁ cant 
source of knowledge about Poland and Poles.
A relatively small number of the British have had direct contact with Poland, as only 6% 
of the interviewees have visited Poland over the past few years; most frequently these are 
people aged 25-34. This is quite likely due to the trend among the British public to stage 
stag and hen parties in ‘exotic’ Central European cities, which are easy to access by low-
cost airlines. As compared to other age groups of British society, nearly two times as many 
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Figure 2. Which of the following statements describe your experience?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
Changes in the way Poland is perceived by the British following its EU accession cannot 
be evaluated in unambiguous terms. The ﬁ rst and foremost conclusion is that Poland is 
slowly ceasing to be an obscure country somewhere at the far reaches of Europe. More and 
more British citizens have their own opinion about Poland as a country and are willing to 
share it with others. In comparison to the 2001 ﬁ ndings, there were noticeably fewer inter-
viewees who did not have an opinion at all or chose an ambivalent answer in response to 
questions about Poland’s internal situation and its standing in the international arena. For 
instance, in 2001, 44% of respondents chose the answer ‘Difﬁ cult to say’ and 18% opted for 
the answer: “I neither agree nor disagree’ to the question as to whether Poland was a par-
liamentary democracy, as compared to only 32% and 12%, respectively, nine years later. 
A similar trend could be observed for questions on the levels of corruption and ‘red tape’, 
the economic situation, respect for civil liberties and assessment of Poland’s relations with 
other countries within and outside the EU.
Very importantly, having ﬁ rm views about Poland and Poles is strongly correlated with 
having earlier contacts with Poles. For instance, as regards their opinion about corruption 
in Poland, 42% of the respondents who have never had any contacts with Poland or Poles 
do not have an opinion about this, as compared to only 26% who have had such contacts 
and still did not feel competent to answer this question. A similar correlation could be ob-
served in the case of ambivalent answers: those respondents who had had earlier contacts 
with Poland and Poles had had more opportunity to form an opinion about our country. 
There are also visible differences of opinion in terms of gender, with male respondents 
more often having a distinct opinion about Poland’s internal situation and its international 
standing than female ones. Similarly, the youngest respondents felt the least competent in 
this regard, and the level of declared knowledge increased with age, to slightly fall among 
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The image of Poland
One of the basic aspects of a country’s image is how it is perceived in terms of size. The 
British still ﬁ nd it very difﬁ cult to assess the number of inhabitants of Poland. Nearly 40% 
of respondents answered: ‘Difﬁ cult to say’ to the question on the size of the Polish popu-
lation. One quarter of interviewees were able to correctly choose the correct range for the 
population of Poland. Most frequently, these were better educated, middle-aged people 
who had had earlier contacts with Poland and Poles. There was an observable tendency 
to understate rather than overstate the size of the population: 17% of respondents were 
of the opinion that Poland had less than 20 million inhabitants, and 10% – over 40 million 
(Fig. 3). 
Figure 3. How big is the population of Poland in your opinion?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
The British have no doubts whatsoever about Poland belonging to Europe both ofﬁ cial-
ly (EU membership) and practically (respect for liberal democracy principles). Nearly 70% 
of the interviewees were aware that Poland is an EU Member State. This result is especially 
pertinent when we compare it to results concerning other countries listed in the question. 
A mere 40% of the British public knew that Slovakia is an EU member; what is more, 15% 
of interviewees were not certain if their own country is a member of the European Union. 
At the same time, 28% of respondents were convinced that Ukraine is also a member of the 
EU (Fig. 4).
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Figure 4. From the following list of countries, please tell me those that 
are members of the European Union
 
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
Poland is the largest of all the new EU member states. Very frequently, when the con-
sequences of the 2004 EU enlargement and the opening of the British labour market to the 
citizens of the new member countries are discussed, Poland and Poles are mentioned (Fo-
mina, Frelak, 2008). In addition to this, Poles are the most populous group amongst new 
EU member citizens who arrived in Britain after 2004. These factors have been largely re-
sponsible for shaping the awareness of the British public concerning Poland’s EU member-
ship. As might be expected, the likelihood that the respondents know that Poland is an 
EU member increases with their social status and age. The lowest percentage of respond-
ents to provide the correct answer on Poland’s EU membership (55%) could be observed 
among the youngest age group. Likewise, young Britons less frequently know that the UK 
is a member of the EU.
A certain discrepancy can be observed in the way Poland is perceived. The majority of 
the respondents did not have any doubts as to Poland being a member of the community 
of democratic states which respect the civil liberties of their residents. More importantly, 
this conviction has become much more widespread as compared to 2001. Nevertheless, re-
spondents continue to consider that quality of life in Poland is not very good on account of 
excessive bureaucracy, widespread corruption, lack of fast economic growth and the major 
role that the Catholic Church plays in social and political life. Such a dual perception of 
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Figure 5. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
Moreover, interesting changes seem to have taken place in the way Poland is perceived 
as compared with nine years earlier. The number of people who agree that Poland is a par-
liamentary democracy just like other Western European countries has increased more than 
twofold; currently only 12% of respondents do not agree with this statement. Likewise, the 
number of respondents who are convinced that civil liberties are respected in Poland has 
grown considerably, from 23% in 2001 to 34% in 2010 (Fig. 6). Similarly, the overall view on 
Poland’s economic development has improved, despite the continued prevalence of sceptical 
opinions on this subject: 25% of interviewees agree that Poland is enjoying rapid economic 
growth as compared to 33% who do not share this opinion (Fig. 7). Interestingly, such opin-
ions can be encountered despite the widespread view that Poland, in comparison with other 
countries, has emerged from the global economic crisis practically unscathed (Fig. 8).
Figure 6. Poland is a country where: (answers from 2001 and 2010)
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
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Opinions about the functioning of the Polish state have not changed considerably, as 
about one third of the British public are still convinced that corruption, bureaucracy and 
the excessive inﬂ uence wielded by the Catholic Church are sources of problems for Poles. 
Such a view may be linked to the mass emigration of Poles to Britain: ‘after all, if every-
thing was so going so well in their country, who would want to leave’ is what the British 
respondents may be thinking. It is just as likely that Poles themselves, in their direct con-
tacts with members of the British public, complain about various aspects of life in Poland, 
thereby trying to justify their decision to come to Britain.
The equivocal results of our survey largely overlap with the results of country rankings, 
e.g. the Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index. According to the experts involved in this rank-
ing, Poland is a country where the political and economic situation is actually better than 
is popularly believed. Poland is an example of a country which is in fact bigger than fre-
quently perceived, has faster economic growth than is widely thought, etc.61
Figure 7. Poland is a country where: (answers from 2001 and 2010)
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
The interviewees were in two minds as regards their evaluation of Poland’s foreign and 
European policy. They had the least doubts as to whether Poland is able to maintain good 
relations with its neighbours. Nearly 40% of the respondents are of the opinion that even if 
Poland had strained relations with its neighbours earlier, it has been able to reconcile the dif-
ferences, as compared to only 12% of the respondents who do not agree with this opinion.
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Figure 8. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
Very likely, reports by the BBC and other mass media on the Polish-Russian reconciliation in 
the wake of the Smolensk catastrophe have played a part in this. As regards Britons’ evalua-
tion of European cooperation and pursuing its own interests, a comparable percentage of the 
respondents expressed radically different opinions. On the one hand, there are respondents 
who think very highly about the way Poles manage their foreign policy, and on the other 
hand there are those who are very critical. Nearly one third of respondents believe that Po-
land is trying to pursue its own interests at the expense of other countries’ interests. The sur-
vey suggests that half of these respondents do not subscribe to the opinion that Poland con-
tributes to better cooperation and stability within the EU (Fig. 9). 
Figure 9. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
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N=1029
9% 23% 26% 14% 18% 9%
Similar 2 3 4 Different Difficult to say/Don't know
It may be expected that the way Poland is perceived has been inﬂ uenced by the opin-
ions on the coalition that was in power in the years 2005-2007, when Poland opposed the 
ratiﬁ cation of the EU constitutional treaty. It should be emphasized that the British me-
dia show little interest in European matters, unless something out of the ordinary hap-
pens. Therefore, if the period following the last parliamentary election brought a change 
in Polish political discourse and in Poland’s international activity, these changes were not 
necessarily instantly visible to British society. What is certainly observable is that the prob-
ability of a favourable opinion about Poland increases in tandem with declared earlier con-
tact with Poland and Poles (and hence with a better knowledge of Poland).
Social distance: the Polish immigrant – almost one of us
Stepping up contacts with Poland and Poles has helped the British public to form a fa-
vourable opinion about our compatriots. Poles are no longer seen as a foreign, exotic na-
tion that confounds understanding. Only as few as 8% of respondents could not answer 
a question about whether Poles are rather similar to or rather different from the British. 
Nine years earlier, there were twice as many such interviewees. Similarly, for a series of 
questions concerning social distance, the percentage of ‘Don’t know’ answers did not ex-
ceed 5% (Fig. 10).
Figure 10. In your opinion, are Poles rather similar to the British or rather different?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
The survey reveals that the British are very open to Poles. One third of respondents 
were of the opinion that Poles are very much like the British, with another quarter believ-
ing that Poles have some similarities with the British, but are different in other respects.
Poles are also viewed favourably in comparison with other ethnic groups. More than 
half of the respondents agreed that Poles ﬁ t in well or very well in British society. Those 
least convinced about this were less-educated respondents performing blue-collar jobs. 
This is a signiﬁ cant result when we take into account the generally sceptical attitude of the 
British to immigration. Those British citizens who have had direct contacts with Poland 
and Poles are more prone to think that Poles are rather similar to the British and are better 
integrated with British society as compared with other ethnic groups (Fig. 11).
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Figure 11. How well do Poles living in Great Britain ﬁ t into British society,
in comparison to other ethnic minorities?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
Whilst the British are very open to Poles in personal contacts, they tend to maintain 
more distance in the institutional and political sphere. Nearly all the respondents agree 
that Poles should have a right to come to Britain as tourists; they also accept having Poles 
as good friends or neighbours. Even more importantly, they would accept a Pole as a 
member of their family; only one in ﬁ ve respondents would not agree to marriage between 
their child and a Polish man or woman (Fig. 12).
 
Figure 12. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
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On the other hand, a relatively higher number of respondents would not welcome a sit-
uation where their company was managed by a Pole, though even in this case opponents 
represent less than one third of the public at large. Similarly, another one third of respond-
ents would not like Poles to move permanently to Britain, and almost 40% of respondents 
do not approve of granting British citizenship to Poles. What respondents found most dif-
ﬁ cult to accept was to see a Pole as their local councillor. This was the only situation where 
the percentage of respondents who would not like to see Poles in a speciﬁ c role was higher 
than that of respondents who would. Interestingly, this result is mostly due to the answers 
of people who have never had contacts with Poles or Poland (Fig. 13).
Figure 13. How strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
If we look at the average results of the study (Figure 14), we see that there is a slight 
prevalence of sceptical attitudes in only two cases – granting citizenship to a Pole and a 
Pole serving as a councillor. Serving as a local councillor means not just being an ordinary 
citizen, but also having additional powers and taking an active part in shaping the life of 
the local community. According to respondents, this is still the preserve of ‘their own kin’. 
In this context, we should recall the respondents’ reservations concerning the high level of 
corruption and bureaucracy in Poland, which may partly explain the respondents’ objec-
tions to discharge of social or economic functions by Poles. Importantly, however, more 
than half of interviewees do not strongly oppose Poles as members of British society. Inter-
estingly, a local Polish councillor does not raise so much controversy among those British 
persons who have had earlier contacts with Poland and Poles. In this category, there is a 
predominance of interviewees who see nothing wrong with it.
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Figure 14. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
 
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
Direct contacts with Poles and increased media coverage have certainly improved the 
image of Poles; it is now much more favourable than that emerging from the survey of 
nine years ago. Respondents who have had contacts with Poland and Poles are deﬁ nitely 
more willing to accept them not only as friends and family members, but also as fellow 
citizens and councillors. Contacts with Poland and above all direct contacts with Poles un-
questionably help foster a positive image of Polish people. Poles serve as very good ‘am-
bassadors’ of their country.
The perceived effects of migration
Respondents’ evaluation of the consequences of opening the British labour market to 
citizens from the new member states and the resultant inﬂ ux of Polish workers to Britain 
is not unequivocal. Nearly 50% of respondents are aware of the positive impact of Polish 
immigrants on Britain’s economic growth and increased tax revenues. According to over 
60% of the people polled, the inﬂ ux of workers from Poland has improved the standing of 
British enterprises (Fig. 15). Interestingly, this opinion reﬂ ects the actual state of affairs, be-
cause at the time of Poland’s EU accession, the number of reported vacancies was 650,000. 
One in four entrepreneurs had difﬁ culties with ﬁ lling vacancies.62
62 Fidel, A., & Piętka, E. Funkcjonowanie polskich migrantów na brytyjskim rynku pracy. Warsaw Centre for 
Migration Research at the University of Warsaw, Warsaw 2007, p. 4.
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Figure 15. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
 
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
Figure 16. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
































Poles have improved the supply
of labour for UK companies
Poles have contributed to the
increase of unemployment in the UK
Poles have contributed to the
increase of public spending on
social care
Poles have contributed to the
decrease of salaries of British
workers
Poles have contributed
to economic growth in the UK
Poles have helped increase the







1 – Strongly agree 5 – Strongly disagree3
Poles have contributed
to the increase of public







Average results from the study
Poles have improved the
supply of labour for UK
companies
Poles have contributed
to the increase of
unemployment in the UK
Poles have contributed
to the decrease of salaries of
British workers
Poles have helped increase
the tax revenues of the UK
budget
Poles have contributed
to economic growth in the UK
Bases: respondents who didn’t choose the answer ‘Difficult to say/don’t know’
The Perception of Poland and Poles in Great Britain 33
However, there is a negative side to Polish immigration. According to the respondents 
(60%), the supply of cheap and efﬁ cient labour from Poland has resulted in an increase in 
unemployment. Poles are also accused of wage dumping, which in turn drives down wages 
in general. About 60% of interviewees claim that cheap Polish workers ‘take jobs’ from the 
British. Such opinions may arise due to the fact that workers from the A8 countries are will-
ing to work for much lower wages than native-born workers, which is conﬁ rmed by statis-
tics comparing average salaries. Nevertheless, it has to be borne in mind that jobs done by 
immigrants usually do not enjoy great popularity among the indigenous population.63
Despite their positive impact on the economy, nearly 60% of respondents equate Polish 
immigration with increased social welfare spending. However, ofﬁ cial statistics do not 
conﬁ rm any allegations about Poles or workers from other new member states being a 
burden on the British social welfare system. Starting from 2004, immigrants from these 
countries have contributed more to the state budget than they have received from it. For 
instance, in the 2008-09 ﬁ scal year alone, they paid in 37% more (as direct and indirect 
taxes) than they took out. The huge scale of Polish migration (especially in the ﬁ rst few 
years after liberalization) – which was not foreseen by the government – has certainly had 
a big inﬂ uence on the above mentioned opinions. The burden on British public services 
(e.g. schools) and housing at a local level has also been signiﬁ cant. 
According to the majority of respondents (75%), typical Polish immigrants are unskilled 
workers (Fig. 17). Moreover, not only do they accept the most difﬁ cult jobs, but they also per-
form them diligently and reliably, which is recognized and appreciated by their employers. 
Figure 17. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
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According to 70% respondents British employers are satisﬁ ed with the work done by 
Poles (Fig. 18). This should not come as a particular surprise since, despite their low wag-
es, Poles are among the hardest-working people in Britain, working on average 41.5 hours 
a week. The proverbial Polish industriousness is more frequently appreciated by those 
who know Poles personally and probably have contacts with them at the workplace. 
According to half of respondents, Poles obey the law.
Figure 18. In your opinion, are companies that employ Poles rather satisﬁ ed 
with their work, or not?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
Six years after Poland joined the European Union, we asked British respondents how 
they evaluated the liberalization of access to their labour market (for Poles). More than half 
of them viewed this decision favourably (55%). However, some of the interviewees (21%) 
emerged as strong opponents of liberalization (Fig. 19). As previously, there are more pro-
ponents of liberalization among respondents who are already familiar with Poland and 
Poles and among better-off respondents.
Figure 19. In 2004 the UK opened its labour market for Poles. Since then,
Poles who work in the UK have had the same rights as British employees.
On the whole, would you say it was the right decision to take?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
The contradictory views on Polish migration expressed by the respondents reﬂ ect the 
typical myths spawned by migration, including exaggerating the real number of immi-
grants, the assumption that they take jobs from the native workforce and make fraudulent 
social security claims. However, the opinions of Britons, also expressed by the media, con-
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trast with the ofﬁ cial statistics.64 These inconsistencies also stem from the different percep-
tion of the inﬂ uence of migration on a macro level – in other words on economic growth 
– and on a micro level, from the perspective of a given person: an employee of a given 
company and inhabitant of a given district. Although Britons appreciate the positive inﬂ u-
ence of the presence of Polish workers on economic growth, they can at the same time con-
sider that for them personally the situation has not improved. The local dimension is not 
without signiﬁ cance here – the costs of immigration have been borne to a large extent by 
local communities.
According to statistics of November 2010, the scale of inﬂ ux of immigrants from new 
member states has stabilised and we should not expect a signiﬁ cant increase as in 2005 and 
200765. A number of factors have had an inﬂ uence on this situation, such as the recession, 
the drop in the value of the pound in relation to, for example, the zloty, liberalization of 
the labour market in other countries and ﬁ nally the short term nature of the migration. For 
example, the number of Poles who registered on the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) 
from January to September 2010 was 50 thousand (from January to September 2009 it was 
60 thousand). In the same period, applications by workers from Lithuania and Latvia in-
creased by several thousand66.
At the same time, however, many Poles are deciding on long-term migration and this 
may constitute a challenge of sorts for the state. For, on the one hand, hundreds of thou-
sands of Poles have been received and even ‘absorbed’ exceptionally well, which is con-
ﬁ rmed by the results of studies. On the other hand, the reservations expressed in this sur-
vey as to Poles settling, taking on citizenship or having an active inﬂ uence on the local life 
of the community raise a question mark as to how Britons may react in the future to such 
long-term migration.
Polish products for Poles only?
Opinions about products and brands associated with a given country represent a sig-
niﬁ cant part of how the country is perceived by others. While the British have already 
formed an opinion about Poles, they do not have one as regards Poland. Only one in ﬁ ve 
respondents gave a positive answer to the question about familiarity with Polish products 
(Fig. 20). Quite unsurprisingly, knowledge of Polish products increases with knowledge 
of Polish people: one third of the respondents who have had earlier contacts with Poland 
and Poles claim that they are familiar with Polish products. Owing to Polish immigration 
to Britain and cheap airline connections with Poland, more and more British people have 
become familiar with the taste of bigos, barszcz, Polish beer and Polish vodka.
64 S. Mulley, Immigration and Employment: Anatomy of a media story, Institute for Public Policy Research, 
London, August 2010.
65 See Migration Statistics, Institute for Public Policy Research, London, November 2010.
66 Migration Statistics Quarterly Report, Ofﬁ ce for National Statistics, London, November 2010
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Figure 20. Do you know any Polish products or brands?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
Poles act as ambassadors of Polish brands; they willingly get involved in raising brand 
awareness by recommending products, places where they can be bought and restaurants 
which are worth visiting. In the case of Polish products, although ‘word of mouth’ is truly 
invaluable, it remains limited to a relatively small circle. Market research polls conﬁ rm the 
low awareness of Polish brands among the British public: the majority of the 37% of re-
spondents who had bought Polish food products due to their Polish origin were not able 
to name any speciﬁ c brands.67
On the one hand, this is hardly surprising as there are only a few Polish products that 
are sufﬁ ciently exceptional to appeal to a British clientele. Polish sauerkraut (kiszona kapus-
ta) or Polish juices can hardly compete with curry sauce or Chinese vegetables. Likewise, 
Polish cuisine is not fashionable in the way Italian or Asian cuisine is. Poland does not 
have such characteristic brands as, for example, Volvo or Nokia. On the other hand, how-
ever, it seems that more often than not it is Polish producers and manufacturers that show 
little interest in ‘pitching’ their products to the British, and focus their marketing strategies 
mainly on the Polish Diaspora.
Given this situation, we should not be surprised that respondents for whom Polish 
products had no obvious associations were not able to say whether a ‘made in Poland’ 
label would encourage them to buy a product or rather discourage them. In fact, about 
80% of respondents simply could not say (Fig. 21). Another factor that makes this response 
unsurprising is the great distance still existing between Polish brands and global leaders in 
terms of recognisability. According to the Anholt-Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index, Polish 
products/brands are ranked 28th out of 50 countries surveyed.68
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Figure 21. Would the information that a given product was made in Poland 
somewhat encourage or discourage you from buying it?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
The same could be said about respondents’ interest in, or familiarity with Polish cul-
ture. According to the Anholt-Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index, Poland is only ranked 30th 
in terms of culture and heritage.69 With the British public being so unknowledgeable about 
Polish products in general, it is hardly surprising that only a relatively small number of 
respondents were aware that for 13 months they had had an opportunity for contact with 
Polish culture under the Polska! Year project. Only 8% of the British public had heard about 
this initiative aimed at promoting Polish culture in the UK, and just 1% of respondents de-
clared that they had taken part in cultural events organised as part of this project (Fig. 22).
Figure 22. Did you take part in any of the events which were organized
as part of the Polish culture year in the UK (Polska! Year)?
Source: The Institute of Public Affairs 2010.
In spite of the fact that this initiative attracted a lot of coverage in the British press, this 
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Poland. Our survey also indicated that this was still an elite event. Knowledge about Pol-
ska! Year is much more widespread among respondents with the highest social status.
Summary
As we can see, referring to Poles who live and work in Britain as ‘an arm of the MFA’ is 
not completely unfounded. Our survey shows that Poles can act as excellent ambassadors 
for their country and that they shape (and will continue to shape) a positive image of Poles 
and Poland. Poles are generally liked by the British at the level of personal contacts, and 
are accepted as members of British society. Also importantly, in the general anti-immigra-
tion climate, the opening of the labour market to citizens of Central and Eastern European 
countries (with Poles as the largest and most visible group) is widely viewed as a good 
decision. 
On the other hand, the Poland brand still remains blurred. Polish products can be found 
almost everywhere today, but there is still no leading brand (or brands) with which Po-
land is associated abroad. Since Polish companies often do not have the necessary means 
to promote their products abroad, and since, furthermore, there is a lack of promotional 
strategies concerning particular groups of regional products, the signiﬁ cance of the Polish 
Diaspora as a “Polish ambassador” should not be underestimated.
The Polska!Year promotional programme certainly helped raise awareness of Polish cul-
ture amongst the social elites and demonstrated that Poland is not just good vodka and 
conscientious workers. However, it failed to reach a broader audience: the general public 
in Britain, for the most part, remained unaware of the programme.
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